4. Geographies of discontent in the Nordic context

The Nordic countries have not been immune to the overall western rise in political discontent, but to our knowledge there has been no systematic study of whether rural-urban or periphery-centre divides have formed geographies of discontent in the region. There is, however, significant evidence in all Nordic countries of economic, social, cultural and demographic divergence between central and peripheral areas and of the latter having been somewhat neglected by national governance (State of the Nordic Region 2018). As Eriksson and Tollefsen (2022) note, there has been a “general upsurge in political debates around uneven development and spatial divisions and deprivation during the 2010s”. Limited country-specific studies have shown some evidence that such inequalities may be forming geographies of discontent in the Nordic region, primarily in peripheral areas but more comprehensive, region-wide studies are needed (Stein et al. 2021, Erlingsson et al. 2023).

All five Nordic states saw a change in electoral behaviour and also, to various extents, a rise in popularity of non-traditional and/or anti-establishment parties and/or platforms in the 2010s. Martinez-Toledano and Sodano (2021) also found varying degrees of an electoral urban-rural divide in all five countries.

Iceland, the country hit hardest by the financial crisis, experienced mass protests and the unprecedented success of multiple new political parties in 2010s. In the 2010 local election, many voters abandoned the four established parties and voted for new parties, stayed home or cast a blank ballot. Turnout in local elections was the lowest for decades at 74%. Over 6% of voters cast a blank or void ballot. (Önnudóttir et al. 2021).

In Sweden, many have described the 2010 election as a turning point in Swedish politics given that the far-right anti-immigration party, the Sweden Democrats, entered parliament for the first time with 5.7 percent of votes. The 2014 election saw them succeed in doubling their share of the vote to 13%, which meant that none of the traditional political blocs was able to form a majority. In the 2022 election, they reached 20.5 per cent. (Jylhä et al. 2019). Geographically, Michaud and colleagues (2021) have found that the Swedish electoral landscape has become increasingly fragmented since the early 2000s, driven by dominance of the Sweden Democrats in southern Sweden.

In Norway, the Social Democrats that had held power for eight years lost the parliamentary elections in 2013 to a centre-right coalition. The winning populist Progress Party entered government for the first time as part of a coalition, marking a turning point in the party’s electoral success. (Bjerkem 2016).

In Finland, the 2011 election saw the unexpected success of the right-wing populist Finns Party, paving the way for a further victory for the party in 2015. In the 2019 parliamentary elections, the Finns Party won nearly 18% of votes, becoming the second largest party. The Finns Party has typically attracted votes in rural and remote areas. (Salo 2022).

Finally, election behaviour has proven slightly more complex in Denmark. The Danish People's Party garnered 21% of the vote in 2015, with most of its support coming from rural areas. By the 2019 elections, however, the party’s populist platform had been partly adopted by the mainstream parties and the Danish People’s Party lost support. In 2022, two new anti-establishment parties formed. One of them, the Denmark Democrats received 8.1% of the vote and explicitly targeted rural areas with an anti-urban agenda. (Sörensen and Svendsen 2023).

All Nordic countries are western liberal democracies and there is nothing in the academic literature to suggest that the key factors potentially driving geographies of discontent in other countries, such as the economic, socio-cultural and recognition inequalities, as well as demographic factors, identified above, are not applicable or at least partly applicable to the Nordic context. Most if not all the factors mentioned in the previous section should therefore be considered when conducting any comprehensive empirical study of the phenomenon of geographies of discontent in the Nordic region. However, given some of the distinct political, social, economic and geographic characteristics of the Nordic countries, such as, but not limited to, parliamentary democracy stability, high levels of decentralisation, the universal, tax-funded welfare state and a unique blend of socialism and capitalism, it could be that certain factors identified above are of greater or lesser importance in terms of understanding discontent. Furthermore, the Nordic countries have experienced high immigration rates in the past 15 years. The refugee crisis of 2015 in particular led to significant numbers of asylum seekers and refugees from countries such as Syria and Afghanistan seeking refuge in the Nordic countries.

In this final section we briefly describe the factors that should be considered in future empirical analysis of geographies of discontent in the Nordic region.

The Nordic countries experienced the 2008 crises differently and showed more resilience than most of the western world. The economies of Norway, Sweden and Denmark started recovering as quickly as by 2010 and Iceland’s economy had followed suit by 2012. Finland took longer to recover as it faced tougher structural and unemployment issues but its economy had also started to pick up by 2016. However, like many other OECD countries, the 2010s was a decade that saw a deepening spatial and interpersonal divide in the Nordic countries. (Meinander 2021). According to the Territorial Cohesion Development Index, which monitors the development of territorial cohesion, peripheral regions fell further behind urbanised areas in Denmark, Finland and Sweden in the 2010s, although that was not the case in either Norway or the Åland Islands (Rauhut and Marques da Costa 2021).

Globalisation and economic restructuring have led to the peripheral, rural and remote Nordic areas in general facing the same challenges of competition and economic attractiveness confronted by other regions in the world (Meinander 2021). Sparsely populated areas traditionally associated with manufacturing have lagged behind urban areas offering knowledge service jobs (Eriksson and Hane-Weijman 2017). National and EU regional development policy interventions focusing on regional economic growth and competitiveness have been implemented throughout the region to curb the centralisation effects of globalisation. Overall, however, Knudsen (2020) has showed that Nordic regional policies that have focused on regional competitiveness and not necessarily spatial equality have contributed to the rural-urban divide to a certain extent, for example through the regional policies of smart specialisation, which has favoured already well-off areas. The extent of the impact of such regional development policies on spatial inequality varies substantially, however, between the countries in the region. Norway and the Åland Islands have developed a relatively successful regional policy, with the former placing a strong emphasis on rural development, whereas Denmark, Finland and Sweden are more reliant on the European Cohesion Policy. The Swedish case is often seen as representing an “extreme” in terms of rapid rural depopulation, postwar industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation of the economy (Knudsen 2020, Eriksson and Tollefsen 2022). In Finland, neither national nor European regional policy appear to have prevented an increase in spatial economic inequality in the country (Fina et al. 2021). Iceland’s particularly high levels of urbanisation and the fact that over two-thirds of the population live in the city-region of Reykjavik could make the country particularly vulnerable to urban economic dominance over remote areas. Some scholars have gone so far as to call regional policy in the Nordic countries neocolonial on the grounds that those countries deprive lagging regions of their assets by way of resource extraction and/or state-led centralisation (Jakobsen et al. 2022, Eriksson 2008). Carson and colleagues (2022) further argue that regional development policy in the Nordic region is not well adapted to sparsely populated areas and reinforces the “urbanisation of the hinterland” and the development of dominant small service towns. Regional and rural policy, however, represent a relatively small proportion of state budgets in the Nordic region. The financial equalisation schemes, such as the transfer of government resources between richer and poorer municipalities, that can be found in all Nordic countries have been shown to play a role in reducing rural/urban inequalities. (Tillväxtanalys, 2021)

The Nordic welfare states have gradually been cut back since the 1980s (Allelin et al. 2021). Neoliberalist policies in the Nordic region have led to an increase in marketised welfare services, meaning that they have become less universal and less equal (Allelin et al. 2021, Östberg 2021). Eriksson and Tollefsen (2022) underline how that has increased the vulnerability of some households and places compared to others and, according to the findings of the Nordic Council of Ministers (2018), welfare and service gaps have increased between and within rural and urban regions. (Eriksson and Tollefsen, 2022, Slätmo 2023). That is the case particularly in Sweden, where the welfare state has seen higher levels of privatisation than other Nordic countries (Björling and Rönnblom 2023). Furthermore, in Europe, the Nordic region stands out as having some of the most mobile populations and a strong urbanisation trend (Nordic Council of Ministers 2018). That has led to significant population loss and demographic change in rural and remote areas, making public service provision in these areas a challenge. Indeed, service provision in the Nordic region is mainly reliant on local tax revenue, with the diminishing population resulting in local rural public sector often not having the funds to cover its service needs. That financial struggle is made worse by challenging geographical circumstances such as low-density levels and long distances to services and the fact that rural areas tend to have an older age structure than urban areas. Decreasing populations and lower wages also mean that Nordic rural areas have difficulties attracting highly skilled workers to work in the public service sector. Many rural areas therefore often have higher than average income tax rates to cover the cost of delivering services in part. Despite that and the significant financial equalisation schemes between municipalities in the Nordic countries, the availability of services often remains lower than in urban areas. (Slätmo 2023).

Bremberg (2020) has demonstrated that healthcare provision is insufficient in areas with low population density in Finland, Norway and Sweden. In terms of education, Beach and colleagues (2018) have found that there is a tendency to close small urban and rural schools in Finland, Norway and Sweden in general. Transport costs are also often lower in cities in the Nordic region and there are fewer and less frequent public transport options and services in rural areas. That particularly affects those without a licence or access to a vehicle. (Wøien Meijer et al. 2023). Furthermore, access to adequate housing in Nordic rural areas has been shown to be a challenge for certain social groups due to the fact that rural housing markets are dominated by privately owned individual houses, which are unaffordable and/or inaccessible to certain groups. Many of those challenges, especially those linked to transport, housing and education, have made rural areas less attractive and a challenge for young people (Wøien Meijer et al. 2023). The combination of those important factors has led to a general decrease in services and closures in rural/peripheral areas, which in turn has resulted in a worsening quality of life and levels of wellbeing, as well as shorter life expectancy in rural areas over time (Lundgren et al. 2020).

Finally, with respect to Denmark, Sørensen and Svendsen (2023) have revealed that not all rural areas have political capital, i.e. a community’s capability to organise and coordinate politically for the collective good, which in turn has repercussions on an area’s economic and social wellbeing. That could be linked to a lack of institutional meeting places such as assembly houses or multifunctional centres in rural areas compared to urban ones.

In all Nordic countries there are signs of a significant recognition gap and disparities in worthiness and acknowledgment between rural areas and urban areas. First, when it comes to the people living in rural and urban areas, scholars have found evidence both in media and political discourse that rural communities in Sweden, Denmark and Finland are often portrayed as the “obsolete white working class” as opposed to the “modern middle class” that populates urban areas. (Eriksson 2010). Second, when it comes to how the places themselves are portrayed, rural areas are regularly referred to as places in need of financial support that are surviving only thanks to generous urban support. The northern areas of Finland and Sweden in particular are described as being lonely, sparsely populated and devoid of culture or social happenings. Regional policy and tax systems are seen by some to be nourishing that stigma by hiding some of the important economic and contributions of those northern areas and some scholars have even argued that there is an exploitation of natural resources. (Eriksson and Tollefsen 2022). In Denmark, Rudolph and Kirkegaard (2019) found evidence that wind farm developers, for example, have been pushing the stigma of rural decline to justify the purchase and demolition of properties in marginalised rural areas. That recognition gap has not only fuelled a cultural divide but also regional and place resentment in rural areas. In Sweden, for example, signs of regional resentment manifest themselves in the existence of rural social movements that campaign against the closure of public services and that express a feeling of being abandoned by the national government (Lundgren, 2020). A report by Öhrvall (2023) also found that people living in Swedish rural areas believe that they have different values ​​from those who live in the cities and that the city dwellers do not care about the countryside.

Like in the rest of the western world, rural and remote areas in the Nordic region have ageing populations and a more strongly increasing proportion of the elderly (+ 65) in relation to the working-age population (16-64 years). That increase is considerably smaller in urban areas, which typically have a young population and a high proportion of the well-educated. One of the main reasons for that is that many young people leave rural areas in their twenties (20–29 years) for educational or professional reasons, although today there are some signs of counter-urbanisation, headed by younger people in their thirties (30–39 years) working in the public sector. There are also often more men than women living in Nordic rural areas, with gender ratios tending to show a deficit of women in the countryside due to outmigration of women to urban areas. (Lundgren et al. 2020).