The COVID-19 pandemic led to border closures, also called ‘covid fencing’, across Europe. Photo: Jeswin Thomas

Like the rest of the world, the Nordic countries now find themselves stumbling from one crisis to another; the refugee crisis in 2015/16, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020/21 and the Russian war on Ukraine in 2022. All those crises have already had consequences and will most probably also have additional ones for cross-border labour market mobility in the future.

In the modern era, the Nordic countries have been comparatively successful at adapting to change –demographic changes, urbanisation, automation of jobs and the declining importance of core industries. However, this cannot be taken for granted, and in recent years several elements of the well-regulated Nordic model for working life have been disputed (Dølvik and Steen, 2018). Historically, whenever there has been tension between the national desire to maintain control over borders and moves to guarantee free movement, the national interest has always come out on top (Tervonen, 2017).

This was also the case with the refugee crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, often with difficult consequences for cross-border municipalities and regions dependent on cross-border commerce and a larger cross-border pool of labour. Travel restrictions imposed to stop the pandemic had devastating effects for commuters (e.g. workers and students) through longer travel time, greater insecurity, loss of access to public services, friends and family and for businesses and cross-border commerce. Those problems were particularly severe in areas with frequent commuting, such as the Öresund area, Torneå-Haparanda and Svinesund. Several of the problems are also similar to those encountered during the refugee crisis and the subsequent border controls in 2016, when four types of effects were found: emotional and image effects; practical obstacles for travellers; higher costs to maintain the border controls and economic consequences at regional level (Andresen et al., 2016). However, statistics reveal that a downward trend in commuting had set in even before the pandemic made mobility more difficult. The number of cross-border commuters fell significantly from 2015 –2017, and the data also shows that fewer young people are applying for jobs in neighbouring countries (Brun et al., 2021).

The COVID-19 pandemic led to border closures, also called ‘covid fencing’, across Europe and affected the approximately 1.9 million people (2018) who work on the other side of a border in the Schengen area. Not only were different sectors severely hit, such as health, transport and public transport, but the ideas of a globalized world without borders and de-territorialism took a hit, triggering an intense debate about border closures (Medeiros et al. 2021).  In their study, Medeiros et al. (2021) explored the effects by means of a Territorial Impact Assessment (TARGET-TIA) on the dimensions of accessibility, institutional co-operation, economic co-operation, social co-operation and cultural co-operation. Although data has been collected by organisations such as the Committee of the Regions, the OECD and the Association of European Border Regions, the impact of the closed borders and covid-fencing should be further investigated as the effects are not yet fully understood.

Some say that the effects of the pandemic and the resulting cross-border travel restrictions represent the lowest point in Nordic co-operation since its formal establishment some 70 years ago. This has since been addressed by the Ministers for Nordic Co-operation (MR-SAM) in a joint declaration issued in summer 2022. In it, they admit that the pandemic presented the Nordic societies with a number of new challenges, many of which had a serious impact on relations between the Nordic countries and, in particular, restricted freedom of movement. “We agree on the need to learn from all of these experiences, both positive and negative. Living, working, studying and running businesses across Nordic borders should be easy,” they say in the declaration. Later, they add: “… we also have a particular responsibility for cross-border freedom of movement. We have, therefore, renewed and strengthened the mandate of the Freedom of Movement Council to remove obstacles to freedom of movement and stop new ones from arising” (Nordic Council of Ministers, n.d.c.).

While the pandemic was a crucial challenge to both cross-border mobility and to Nordic co-operation itself, it also triggered a rapid rise in remote working (Nordic Council of Ministers, n.d.b; Randall et al., 2022). If the trend of more remote working and living continues, we can expect to see greater political interest in good transport infrastructure. Past findings show the importance of access to reliable public transport for cross-border mobility (Grunfelder et al., 2020) and that well-functioning, robust and sustainable infrastructure is essential to enhancing mobility and boosting economic growth and welfare (Greater Copenhagen Committee, 2016). This is also reflected in the post-pandemic recommendations for the border region between Norway and Sweden, which include connecting Oslo and Stockholm with a fast and long-term sustainable train link, greater freedom of movement by creating the right conditions for cross-border labour markets, digitalised joint social security systems and e-services and more support for cross-border co-operation (Region Värmland, 2022).

The lessons learned so far from the crises include that they resulted in severe obstacles to the free movement of people in the Nordic countries and that the impact on the regions differed across the Nordic countries (Creutz et al., 2021). There also seems to be a general acceptance that Nordic governments should work more closely together in the future.