Go to content

From fragmented information to a Nordic overview: the synthesis gap


Image: Karin Beate Nøsterud / Norden.org
A substantial body of evidence on Nordic democracy already exists, but it is dispersed across international indices, underlying datasets, surveys and country reports. As Part 1 has shown, these sources differ in their concepts, units of analysis, geographical and temporal coverage, scoring scales and data-collection methods, making their findings difficult to compare directly. As a result, relevant signals may remain isolated within individual datasets or qualitative assessments and may not be visible in headline scores. Two approaches could address this synthesis gap. The first would develop a structured qualitative Nordic overview of existing evidence and use it as the basis for periodic assessments. The second would construct a harmonised Nordic dataset from selected indicators in existing global sources, providing the foundation for a Nordic democracy measurement framework and one or more composite indices for Nordic countries.
The first approach would systematically bring together findings from global democracy datasets, surveys and country reports within a shared analytical structure. Sources could be mapped against common democratic dimensions, levels of governance and time periods. This would make it possible to identify recurring lower-scoring areas, assess whether concerns appear consistently across different sources, track developments over time and distinguish country-specific patterns from wider cross-Nordic trends. The output could take the form of a regularly updated Nordic democracy overview, dashboard or periodic report that combines quantitative trends with concise qualitative interpretation without producing a new overall index.
The second approach would move from evidence synthesis to the construction of a harmonised dataset and a new measurement framework for the Nordic Region. It would require a transparent process for defining the conceptual framework and screening candidate indicators. Selected indicators would need to be normalised where scales differ and organised under clearly defined dimensions. This approach could produce a common Nordic dataset and comparable country profiles without necessarily requiring extensive new data collection.
Tables 14 and 15 illustrate the potential of the first approach by showing what becomes visible when findings from different indices and country assessments are considered together. Table 14 consolidates lower-scoring areas by country, while Table 15 identifies themes that recur across the Nordic Region. Together, they not only demonstrate the potential value of systematic synthesis but also provide an initial basis for considering which dimensions and indicators might warrant closer examination in a Nordic democracy dataset.
Table 14: Lower-scoring areas identified across the indices by country
Country
Lower-scoring areas identified across indices
Denmark
Rights of immigrants and newcomers (Freedom House index); lower political participation (EIU Democracy Index); stricter migration policies and challenges related to minority inclusion (GSoD Indices); slight decline in perceived integrity and public-sector performance (CPI)
Finland
Hate speech, harassment and discrimination against minorities (Freedom House index); lowest Nordic score for political participation (EIU Democracy Index); weaker participatory democracy and limited direct citizen influence (V-Dem indices); declining press freedom and concerns regarding self-censorship (GSoD Indices); stricter migration policies (GSoD Indices); gender-based violence concerns (GSoD Indices); declining perceptions of integrity and corruption control (CPI)
Iceland
Close links between political and business elites and concentrated media ownership (Freedom House index); weaker functioning of government (EIU Democracy Index); lowest Nordic Liberal Democracy score (V-Dem indices); weaker participatory democracy (V-Dem indices); declining economic equality (GSoD Indices); declines in academic freedom and freedom of expression (GSoD Indices); increasingly fragmented coalition politics (GSoD Indices); gender-based violence concerns (GSoD Indices); worsening corruption perceptions (CPI)
Norway
Discrimination against marginalised groups, including Roma communities (Freedom House index); participatory democracy weaker than other democratic dimensions (V-Dem indices); decline in judicial independence and compliance with judicial decisions (GSoD Indices); rising income inequality (GSoD Indices); increasing corruption perceptions (CPI)
Sweden
Rising violent crime and hate-crime concerns (Freedom House index); political participation weaker than electoral and liberal dimensions (EIU Democracy Index and V-Dem indices); declines in civil liberties, particularly freedom of association, assembly and the press (GSoD Indices); more complex coalition formation and rising income inequality (GSoD Indices); persistent gender income and pension gaps (GSoD Indices); the largest Nordic decline in perceived public-sector integrity since 2012 (CPI)
Table 14: Lower-scoring areas identified across the indices by country
Source: Freedom House, 2025a, 2025b, 2025c, 2025d, 2025e; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2025; Andersson, 2016; Mechkova et al., 2016; International IDEA, 2025f; DeVeaux and Jaspers, 2026; Transparency International, 2026
Table 15: Cross-Nordic lower-scoring areas
Lower-scoring area
Main indices
Lower political participation beyond elections
EIU Democracy Index, V-Dem indices, GSoD indices
Minority rights and discrimination concerns
Freedom House index, GSoD indices
Migration and integration challenges
Freedom House index, GSoD indices
Media freedom and pluralism pressures
Freedom House index, GSoD indices
Economic and social equality concerns
V-Dem, GSoD  indices
Concerns about trust, accountability and institutional legitimacy
CPI, DPI
Judicial independence and rule-of-law pressures
GSoD indices
Growing concerns about disinformation, polarisation and social cohesion
GSoD indices, Freedom House index
Table 15: Cross-Nordic lower-scoring areas
Source: Freedom House, 2025a, 2025b, 2025c, 2025d, 2025e; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2025; Andersson, 2016; Mechkova et al., 2016; International IDEA, 2025f; DeVeaux and Jaspers, 2026; Transparency International, 2026