Global democracy assessments indicate a clear trend: reports from organisations such as the Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House and the Varieties of Democracy Institute point to a prolonged period of democratic decline, characterised not by sudden collapse but by a gradual weakening of institutions and democratic norms (Nord et al., 2026; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2025; Freedom House, 2026). Furthermore, recent research suggests that global indicators may be limited in detecting democratic backsliding (Waldner & Lust, 2018).
Democratic backsliding refers to the erosion of core attributes of democratic systems, typically unfolding slowly as institutions, rights and practices that sustain democracy are undermined. Its conceptualisation depends on how democracy is defined—whether narrowly in procedural terms or more broadly as a multidimensional system—and whether decline is understood as a short-term shift or a long-term process (Knutsen et al., 2024; Waldner & Lust, 2018). Contemporary erosion in well-established democracies rarely involves overt breakdowns such as coups. Instead, it often proceeds through incremental legal and administrative changes, including adjustments to constitutions, electoral rules, media regulation, and oversight institutions, that cumulatively weaken accountability (Knutsen et al., 2024). Within these trajectories, regimes may become defective democracies, retaining formal institutions such as elections while lacking key liberal and constitutional qualities. These hybrid systems occupy a space between democracy and autocracy, where political competition continues but is increasingly constrained, gradually hollowing out democratic substance (Knutsen et al., 2024).
Nordic democracies under pressure
In the Nordic countries, there is little evidence of systematic backsliding, and they continue to rank highly across major indices (Nord et al., 2026; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2025; Freedom House, 2026; Sánchez Gassen et al., 2025). However, this strong overall performance should not obscure the importance of understanding the pressures and risks that may shape the conditions under which Nordic democracies operate. The following discussion considers these pressures in relation to both domestic political change and wider global developments.
The rise of discontent
By the mid-2010s, scholars noted that Western democracies were entering an “age of discontent”, marked by growing frustration with political institutions, gaps in representation and uneven socio-economic outcomes (Berman, 2021; Florida, 2021; Rodríguez-Pose, 2020; Solijonov, 2016; Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2023). Across the Nordic Region, all five countries experienced shifts in voting behaviour during this period, including rising support for non-traditional and anti-establishment parties and the emergence of new political divisions. (Bjerkem, 2016; Meinander, 2021; Önnudóttir et al., 2021; Palonen & Sunnercrantz, 2021; Salo, 2022; Sørensen and Svendsen, 2023). These shifts show changing patterns of representation and political mobilisation; however, they become democratically significant only if they affect how institutions function, how rights are protected or how accountability is exercised.
Country-specific examples reflect these broader patterns. Iceland, hardest hit by the financial crisis, saw mass protests and the rise of several new political parties in the 2010s. In the 2010 local elections, many voters abandoned the four established parties, opting instead for new parties, abstaining or casting blank ballots (Önnudóttir et al., 2021). In Sweden, the 2010 election marked a turning point as the far-right, anti-immigration Sweden Democrats entered parliament with 5.7% of the vote. Their support doubled to 12.9% in 2014, blocking either traditional bloc from achieving a majority and grew to 17.5% in 2018 (Jylhä et al., 2019). In Norway, the 2013 parliamentary elections brought the populist Progress Party into government for the first time as part of a centre-right coalition, signalling a major political shift (Bjerkem, 2016). Finland saw the right-wing populist Finns Party gain traction in 2011, continuing its electoral success in 2015 and reaching nearly 18% of the vote in 2019, becoming the country’s second-largest party (Salo, 2022). Denmark’s trajectory differed somewhat: the Danish People’s Party won 21% of the vote in 2015, largely in rural areas, but its support declined by 2019 after mainstream parties adopted parts of its agenda. In 2022, two new anti-establishment parties emerged, including the Denmark Democrats, who won 8.1% of the vote and explicitly targeted rural voters with an anti-urban platform (Sørensen & Svendsen, 2023). At the same time, young people across Europe consistently emerge as a structurally vulnerable group in terms of democratic participation (Bressanelli & Bernardi, 2025). In the Nordic countries, youth turnout is consistently lower than among older cohorts, especially among those in their early twenties (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2017).
Explanations for rising political discontent tend to cluster around two broad perspectives. One emphasises economic transformations, such as deindustrialisation, globalisation, automation and austerity, which have produced uneven outcomes and widened socio-economic divides (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2023; O’Brien & Leichenko, 2003; Guiso et al., 2017; De Ruyter et al., 2021; Sandbu, 2020). The other highlights socio-cultural dynamics, often framed as a cultural backlash, where resistance to progressive value change generates political tensions (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Florida, 2021; Ford and Jennings, 2020; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Immigration plays a central role in both accounts, serving as a focal point through which economic and cultural concerns are expressed (Dijkstra et al., 2020; Larsson et al., 2021; Guiso et al., 2017; Alesina & Tabellini, 2024).
More recent research highlights the spatial dimension of discontent, pointing to “geographies of discontent” shaped by territorial inequalities. Economic growth has disproportionately benefited urban centres, while many rural and peripheral regions face stagnation, population decline and reduced access to services. These conditions can erode trust and generate place-based grievances (De Lange et al., 2023; Iammarino et al., 2019; McCann, 2020; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Rodríguez-Pose, 2020; Kenny & Luca, 2021).
At the same time, empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between political discontent and socio-economic or even geographical vulnerability is not straightforward. Support for populist parties appears to be only weakly associated with material disadvantage and more strongly linked to attitudes such as distrust in institutions and a preference for strong leadership. For example, older and male voters are much more likely to support anti-establishment parties (Gallego et al., 2014). In many cases, support for democracy has remained stable or even strengthened across different population groups, with no clear evidence of a widespread shift towards extreme or anti-democratic positions. The growth of populist support may therefore reflect the mobilisation and political representation of existing attitudes rather than a fundamental change in public opinion. Research particularly highlights the growing importance of representation gaps and the mobilisation of previously disengaged or underrepresented voters (Brunkert et al., 2025).
Global threats
Growing discontent in the Nordic countries is also increasingly shaped by wider global transformations. Over the past two decades, democracies around the world have experienced a succession of major shocks, including the global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, growing geopolitical tensions, armed conflicts, large-scale migration movements and accelerating climate change (Danylenko et al., 2024). At the same time, several scholars argue that the global environment has become less supportive of democracy promotion than in previous decades (Daxecker, 2023; Hyde, 2023).
Digitalisation has further amplified these dynamics by transforming the information environment. Citizens now have access to an unprecedented volume of information, yet greater access does not necessarily strengthen democratic engagement. Social media platforms and algorithmically curated information ecosystems may encourage selective exposure, reinforce existing beliefs and accelerate the spread of misinformation and disinformation (Lindberg, 2023; Maati et al., 2024). According to the 2024 Eurobarometer Youth Survey, social media is the main source of socio-political information for young people in the EU. Although many young people feel confident in their ability to identify false information, research suggests that this confidence often does not correspond to actual ability (European Parliament, 2025). At the international level, foreign interference, disinformation campaigns, cyber threats and wider geopolitical competition increasingly target democratic institutions and public debate (Daxecker, 2023; Hyde, 2023).
Recent crises have further exposed vulnerabilities in democratic governance. The COVID-19 pandemic led many governments to introduce extraordinary restrictions on movement, assembly and other civil liberties. Although often justified by public health concerns, such measures raised questions about executive power, democratic oversight and the protection of fundamental rights. The pandemic also exacerbated social inequalities, intensified political polarisation in many countries and contributed to declining trust in public institutions. Similarly, armed conflicts, most notably Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have generated effects extending beyond the battlefield, including energy insecurity, inflationary pressures, refugee movements and heightened geopolitical tensions. Such crises can act as stress tests for democratic systems, especially when they place pressure on institutional safeguards, rights protection and accountability (Danylenko et al., 2024).
Furthermore, environmental and climate-related risks are expected to become increasingly significant sources of political and societal pressure. Climate change, extreme weather events, biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation are likely to affect economic stability, public health, food systems, infrastructure and patterns of migration. Such disruptions may intensify existing social and territorial inequalities, increase competition for resources and create new governance challenges (Brechin & Lee, 2023). Their relevance to democracy lies primarily in how political systems respond, maintain public trust and sustain social cohesion over time.
Taken together, these pressures suggest that Nordic democracies are operating under changing conditions that may gradually test their resilience, particularly in relation to participation, trust, equality, institutional capacity and social cohesion. The next section therefore examines how existing democracy indices measure democratic performance, what they reveal about the state and development of Nordic democracies, whether they detect signs of erosion or more limited strains, and where important measurement gaps remain.