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Background

Images: Markus Spiske/Unsplash (left), Omar Albeik/Unsplash (right)
Resilience as a concept revolves around the ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a crisis (typically by way of adaptation or transformation). Within security politics, resilience is a strategy for navigating the contemporary threat landscape whereby numerous kinds of crises may emerge—or indeed be embedded—in everyday life (Wigell et al., 2022; Larsson, 2024). When threats remain uncertain, resilience is an approach that accepts the unknown, and “change becomes a matter of adaptation to new circumstances” (Berling & Petersen, 2021, p. 132).
There are many different forms of resilience that have been conceptualised within academia as well as in political discourse ranging from socio-ecological resilience to community resilience, adaptive and exaptive resilience, and economic resilience. Within the Nordic countries, terms such as civil resilience (in Norwegian, sivil motstandskraft), societal resilience (see the Icelandic áfallaþol samfélaga) and collective resilience (Sweden’s gemensam motståndskraft) emerge, among others. Each of these describe national or local abilities to prepare, cooperate, respond, and recuperate from various forms of crisis, including war.

What is psychological resilience

Psychological resilience (in Finnish, henkinen kriisinsietokyky) has emerged as a key term within the Finnish security landscape during the last decade. The latest (2025) Finnish comprehensive security strategy describes psychological resilience as “the ability of individuals, communities, and society to withstand the stress caused by crisis situations and to recover from their impacts” (Finnish Government, 2025, p. 22).
The strategy continues:
The foundation of psychological resilience is created in normal conditions, and it plays a key role in the maintenance of functional capacity during crisis. Good psychological resilience promotes recovery from crises. Psychological resilience is manifested in the will to take action to maintain the stability of society, the population’s living conditions, security, and ultimately, the state’s sovereignty. Building, strengthening, and maintaining psychological resilience is long-term work that takes place throughout society as a whole.
(Finnish Government, 2025, pp. 22-23).
This definition has been the point of departure for the Recognising and supporting psychological resilience project, setting a basis for both the Building Resilience game and further qualitative research among the Nordic countries.

Components and background of psychological resilience

The concept of psychological resilience is just one expression of resilience taken up in Finland’s comprehensive strategy. It relies heavily on trust—in each other, in authorities, and in society as a whole. According to the strategy, there are seven components of psychological resilience (see Box 1). State, institutional, and private organisations play a role in providing the prerequisites for and maintenance of psychological resilience. This includes general social networks, non-profit organisations, religious communities, sports/recreational associations, youth communities, cultural institutions such as libraries and museums, public media services, voluntary civic activities, and various government agencies and ministries. These services, spaces, and communities are where local trust and fellowship among citizens are formed, democratic values are instilled and practiced, community identity is shaped, and common experience is shared. These elements are foundational for motivating a will to act (e.g., to prepare for potential crises, protect or defend during a crisis, or respond and rebuild after a crisis). The motivation to act is deeply entrenched in a notion that there is something—some identity, community, quality, value, or sovereign territory—worth protecting, and a belief that that some threat or series of threats has put such things at risk.
The 2025 comprehensive security strategy is not the first time the Finnish government has referred to the idea of psychological resilience. In fact, according to an interview with the Secretariat of the Security Committee, Finland has used the concept since at least 2003. The formulation as it stands in the latest strategy is a near-identical repetition of its expression in the former strategy (2017) which states that “psychological resilience is expressed in the citizens’ will to defend their country’s independence as well as in the determination to maintain the livelihood and security of the population in all situations” (Finnish Government, 2017, p. 22).
The concept of psychological resilience is related to several other concepts in the realm of security, defence, and civil preparedness (e.g., spiritual defence , psychological defence , civil preparedness ). While it has been prevalent in the Finnish context for several years, it is less concrete in the academic and political discourse in the other Nordic countries. However, within their whole-of-society security approaches—which emphasise the involvement of state and private actors (from communities down to the individual)—all Nordic countries describe some elements of psychological resilience within their strategic security policies.

Box 1. Seven components of psychological resilience

  1. Maintaining cultural services and protecting cultural heritage
  2. Ensuring the basis for religious activities
  3. Ensuring the continuation of youth work and activities, as well as civil sporting activities
  4. Communications (to strengthen trust, inclusion, and faith in the future)
  5. Combatting social exclusion and inequality
  6. Promoting voluntary activities
  7. Recovery
(Finnish Government, 2025)

All-of-society security strategies in the Nordics: New forms of responsibility and trust

While any crisis makes planning a challenge, globalisation and the interconnectedness of various systems and supply chains also means that a singular crisis can have more severe and overlapping ramifications, indicating an era of polycrisis (Keinänen et al., 2025). Furthermore, hybrid threats—which involve disinformation, manipulation, and “coordinated actions designed to create confusion and dilemmas across sectorial lines of responsibility”—undermine democracy and trust (Sandbakken & Karlsson, 2024, p. 165; Borch & Heier, 2024). Recent scholarship also raises the idea of creeping crises whose effects are felt over time (Boin et al., 2021). Thus, the threat landscape of today lies distinct from that of former times in that defence and security strategies must consider not only acute crises but everyday security threats.
The transition from tackling specific crisis moments to maintaining a general state of crisis preparedness challenges notions of exceptionalism and raises difficult questions around responsibility, governance, and strategic planning (Carlsson & Engström, 2025; Liebetrau, 2021; Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2021; Larsson, 2021; Berling & Petersen, 2021). Thus, all Nordic countries have organised some version of total defence as a security approach. Total defence is “a way to prepare and organise for potential threats and crisis that are essentially understood as transboundary in nature” and involves a combination of actors (Berndtsson, 2024, p. 152). Beyond armed forces, total defence expresses the joint efforts made through civil defence, by which the civilian population participates in security efforts, often through acts of preparedness (i.e., civil preparedness). Nordic security strategies and risk assessments refer to war or armed conflict as one form of many potential crisis situations, and the idea of state and private actors cooperating to prepare for and respond to the most dramatic of external threats has also been applied to the logics of societal security in a broad sense. Thus, crisis situations bleed into the everyday, and individuals and communities play a large role in preparing for and safeguarding their own life and health.
In this totalising security landscape, new questions emerge regarding the responsibility held and shared by different actors. It also challenges how communities cooperate, communicate, organise themselves, or work together in everyday and acute situations. The idea of preparedness in recent years has led to an emphasis on self-preparedness and how the individual bears responsibility to ensure his or her own safety (see, e.g., Larsson, 2021). Whether this is the case for all crises, and how this responsibility is allocated to individuals, taken up by grassroots organisations and institutions, or claimed by state actors remains a complex issue which lies at the heart of psychological resilience in practice (Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2021). On the one hand, granting more responsibility to the individual can empower him or her and make use of the existing community linkages at the local level. On the other hand, a shift towards greater individual responsibility means that those who, for various reasons, cannot ensure their own safety or are already marginalised from various communities may be at risk of increased vulnerability in crisis situations. The idea of sharing responsibility before, during, and after a crisis is present across the Nordic countries, both in policy and in the literature, but it remains uncertain how these responsibilities might be divided amongst actors who either already have a mandate to act in times of crisis or who take up new responsibilities in an ad hoc way.
The idea of trust has often been mentioned as a significant and unique element of Nordic societies (Berling & Petersen, 2021; Selle & Wollebæk, 2015; Larsson & Rhinhard, 2021). Developing trust central to psychological resilience, and how it is developed during everyday situations may influence which communities, institutions, or state services people turn to for guidance and provision during acute crisis situations. It is this notion of psychological resilience that the Building Resilience policy game sought to explore.

“Serious gaming” as a tool for discussion in policymaking

In academic literature around security planning and policy, several authors categorise current security threats as “wicked problems,” referring to the seminal work by Rittel & Webber (1973; see also Selle & Wollebæk, 2015; Hyvönen & Juntunen, 2021; Sandbakken & Karlsson, 2024). This is because security threats are multiple, complex, and often unclear, making it difficult to respond with a single solution or fixed strategy. Practices such as scenario-making, role-play simulations, narrative building, and reflection can be used as tools for both diagnosing the complexity of the problem and developing pathways forward (Geurts et al., 2007; Wardekker et al., 2020; Alejandro et al., 2024). This can be especially useful within resilience thinking or disaster management due to the nature of intertwined systems which mean challenges must be tackled from multiple angles and need to involve a range of stakeholders and fields to find a solution (Wardekker et al., 2020; Solinska-Nowak et al., 2018).
Based on such methods, the researchers developed a scenarios-based game, designed to facilitate planning and policymaking discussions, reflection, and strategic thinking around psychological resilience. The Building Resilience game acted as a social learning tool for an array of civil servants working at national, regional, and local level ministries in the Nordic countries. As a “serious game” (Solinska-Nowak et al., 2018), the method enabled these practitioners to exercise experimental thinking in several threat scenarios, combining their own expertise with personal reflection to imitate, explore, critique, and evaluate actions and strategies throughout the three main phases of resilience: preparation, response, and recovery/adaptation (Thomas, 2024).