Image: Evelina Ytterbom / imagebank.sweden.se

Youth participation beyond urban centres:
Why it matters now more than ever

Youth participation beyond urban centres: Why it matters now more than ever

Political discontent in the Nordics

In recent decades, Western democracies have been characterised by political and anti-government protests, declining voter turnout, and the rise of non-traditional or anti-establishment parties (Berman, 2021; Florida, 2021; Rodríguez-Pose, 2020; Solijonov, 2016). This trend is exemplified by the 2010s, described as the “age of discontent”, which saw growing political dissatisfaction among segments of the population, linked to long-term structural changes such as globalisation and marketisation (Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2023). Elements of these dynamics were also evident in the Nordic countries, where all five states saw changes in voting patterns and rising support for anti-establishment parties (Bjerkem, 2016; Meinander, 2021; Önnudóttir et al., 2021; Palonen & Sunnercrantz, 2021; Salo, 2022; Sørensen & Svendsen, 2023).

Studies have identified multiple, interacting drivers of discontent, including economic insecurity, spatial inequalities, socio-cultural tensions, demographic shifts, declining public services and immigration (De Ruyter et al., 2021; Dijkstra et al., 2020; Florida, 2021; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; O’Brien & Leichenko, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose & Bartalucci, 2023). Discontent often emerges among groups or regions that are experiencing relative economic decline or perceived neglect, rather than among the poorest (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018), and some evidence suggests that support for populist parties is driven more by attitudes, ideological distrust in institutions and a desire for strong leadership (Brunkert et al., 2025). Such trends of discontent have profound implications for democracy and contribute to what is often described as a “crisis of democracy”, characterised by declining citizen participation, polarisation, disinformation and unequal political influence (Bressanelli & Bernardi, 2025; Ercan & Gagnon, 2014).

Rural youth: Vulnerable groups in vulnerable places

Image: Mads Schmidt Rasmussen / norden.org

Vulnerable places

At the national level, the Nordic countries continue to display relatively high levels of electoral participation, with no clear overall decline in voter turnout in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, while turnout in Finland has stabilised following earlier decreases. Similarly, while support for populist parties has increased in some cases, particularly in Sweden and more recently in Finland, there is no consistent or uniform rise across the Region, with support declining in Norway and Denmark after earlier peaks (Sánchez Gassen et al., 2025).

However, these stable national patterns mask significant territorial variations. To understand territorial differences in political participation and discontent, it is first necessary to distinguish between the types of municipalities. Drawing on the Nordic municipal typology developed by Stjernberg et al. (2024) (Figure 1), Nordregio categorises municipalities into three groups:

Urban municipalities: Inner and outer urban areas
Intermediate municipalities: Peri-urban areas, rural areas close to urban centres, and some local centres in rural areas
Rural municipalities: Rural heartlands, sparsely populated areas and some local centres in rural areas.

Across the Nordic Region, political engagement and dissatisfaction vary markedly between urban, intermediate and rural areas and is often most pronounced in intermediate municipalities, which are neither fully urban nor fully remote (Sánchez Gassen et al., 2025).

Support for populist parties is generally highest in peri-urban areas, rural local centres and rural municipalities close to cities, while metropolitan cores and the most remote areas typically show lower levels of support (Figure 2). In certain intermediate and rural regions, support for these parties can reach as high as 50%. Furthermore, urban areas and municipalities near major cities tend to have higher turnout, while rural and sparsely populated areas, particularly in northern Norway, Sweden and Finland, show lower levels of participation (Figure 3). Although election results are an imperfect measure, they offer a useful indication of areas in which political discontent is most pronounced (Sánchez Gassen et al., 2025).

Figure 1: Nordic urban-rural typology

Note: This grid-based classification was developed by the Nordic thematic groups 2021–2024 to enable more accurate cross-Nordic statistical comparisons. The seven types are defined based on population density, proximity measures and land-cover parameters.

Figure 2: Votes for populist parties in national elections (2023 or latest election before this year)

Note: The map compares the share of votes cast for populist parties in national elections in each municipality compared to the national average. Municipalities highlighted in blue are those who have below-average votes for populist parties; municipalities in red are above average. Based on the PopuList project, the following parties are classified as populist: The Danish People’s Party and the New Right (Denmark), Movement Now and the Finns Party (Finland), Progress Party, Red Party and Coastal Party (Norway), and the Sweden Democrats (Sweden). In the map legend, “pp” stands for percentage points.

Figure 3: Turnout in national elections (2023 or latest election prior to this year)

Note: The map compares turnout in national elections in each municipality to the national average. Municipalities highlighted in blue are those with higher-than-average turnout; municipalities in red have lower-than-average turnout rates. The map shows turnout in the following elections: Stortinget 2021 (Norway), Riksdagen 2022 (Sweden), Folketinget 2022 (Denmark), Eduskunta 2023 (Finland), Althing 2021 (Iceland) and Inatsisartut 2021 (Greenland).

Vulnerable groups

Across Europe, one in five 16–26-year-olds report that they would accept authoritarian rule under certain circumstances, while an additional 10% express indifference toward democratic governance (Bressanelli & Bernardi, 2025). Furthermore, youth turnout in the Nordic countries is consistently lower than among older cohorts, especially among those in their early twenties. This gap is most pronounced in local elections, which may indicate political discontent, although turnout alone is not a sufficient measure (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2017).

Finally, according to the 2024 Eurobarometer Youth Survey, social media is the main source of socio-political information for young people in the EU. Exposure to disinformation is widespread, and although many young people feel confident in their ability to identify false information, research suggests this confidence is often overstated. As disinformation can weaken civic engagement and erode institutional trust, this reinforces the need for targeted and impactful youth participation, particularly in peri-urban areas, rural local centres, and rural municipalities close to cities, which are more likely to support anti-establishment parties (European Commission, n.d.; European Parliament, 2025).

Youth participation as a driver of democratic resilience

Image: Martin Zachrisson / norden.org

The concentration of political dissatisfaction in specific regions, combined with the particular vulnerability of youth, makes participation beyond urban centres particularly important. Engaging young people in these areas is not only a matter of ensuring democratic rights; it is also essential for reinforcing democratic resilience at the intersection of generational and territorial vulnerabilities. Without targeted efforts to encourage engagement, communities run the risk that democratic practices and trust in governance will wane.

The EU increasingly recognises youth participation – understood here as young people’s formal and informal involvement in civic and political life – as a core element of democratic resilience, i.e. a political system’s capacity to maintain democratic principles under pressure, adapt institutional practices and restore stability after disruption. Democratic resilience depends not only on formal institutions, but also on the quality of interactions between political actors, civil society and citizens. European Parliament initiatives reflect this understanding by emphasising early and sustained citizen engagement through measures that strengthen electoral participation, support deliberative processes, and fund civic education and participatory democracy (Bressanelli & Bernardi, 2025). Further, the OECD (2025) identifies trust as a foundation of democratic resilience. Indeed, citizens who feel heard are more likely to trust their government. Yet young people remain among the most disaffected groups. Across 30 OECD countries, the OECD Trust Survey 2024 found that only 36% of 18–29-year-olds trust their government (OECD, 2025). Investing in youth participation is therefore one way of strengthening the democratic resilience of communities where young people feel least heard.