3. What are potential drivers of public discontent in Europe and other Western countries, according to the literature?

• Economic factors: Some studies suggest that increasing economic insecurity is contributing to discontent in Western democracies. Since the 1980s, changes such as automation, the rise of the knowledge economy, globalization, and neo-liberal austerity policies have challenged the postwar era, which was characterised by class-based political parties and efforts to achieve full employment, decent salaries and stable jobs. While higher educated, mobile groups have benefited more from new opportunities and higher incomes, workers in some traditional industries have faced growing job insecurity, stagnant or declining wages, and higher risks of unemployment (Guiso et al. 2017, Sandbu 2020). Nonetheless, evidence for the economic explanation is mixed, and some studies have found that it is not necessarily the poorest and most vulnerable groups who express discontent but rather middle-class voters. Some experts have argued that discontent among these groups may be fuelled by worries about wealth and status decline rather than de-facto deprivation (van Prooijen 2021).

• Spatial inequalities: The socio-economic challenges mentioned above have not affected all areas equally. Some regions in Western countries have experienced more pronounced impacts than others. The decline of traditional industries has led to higher levels of unemployment, lower incomes and stagnation in these areas, contributing to outmigration trends. Based on this line of research, it has been argued that growing spatial inequalities between regions have contributed to the formation of discontent in areas that are stagnating or falling behind. These areas, where feelings of being left behind and neglected are particularly strong, have been referred to as “geographies of discontent” in the literature (Koeppen et al. 2021, de Ruyter et al. 2021). Recent publications have nuanced this argument and highlighted that discontent does not necessarily emerge in the poorest places but rather in areas that have experienced the strongest relative decline or where residents worry about future economic decline (McKay et al. 2024, Rodríguez-Pose 2018).
  In the Nordic Region, according to the Territorial Cohesion Development Index, peripheral regions have fallen behind urban areas in Denmark, Finland and Sweden during the 2010s. However, this was not the case in Norway or the Åland Islands (Rauhut and Marques da Costa 2021, Knudsen 2020). The latter two countries have developed relatively successful regional policies to support rural areas. In Iceland, the fact that over two-thirds of the population live in the Reykjavik city-region makes the country particularly vulnerable to urban economic dominance over rural areas.

• Socio-cultural factors: Some scholars have argued that discontent cannot be solely explained by economic factors. The “cultural backlash thesis” suggests that a deeper cultural divide has occurred within the West, resulting in a backlash against progressive cultural change (Inglehart and Norris 2016). In postwar western societies, when immediate material needs such as food, shelter and existential security were increasingly met, a shift towards post-material values such as self-fulfillment, independence, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism occurred. The expansion of education and empowerment of women have further nourished those new values and identities (Ford and Jennings 2020). Such movements, however, have triggered a backlash among once more predominant and privileged members of the population, who feel threatened by the change in cultural values, actively reject those progressive values and criticize the decline in more traditional norms and customs (Inglehart and Norris 2016).

• Demographic factors: These cultural factors can be reinforced by demographic trends. Urban centres often offer a wider range of educational and employment opportunities, particularly attracting young individuals who move to these areas for education and jobs, including in the Nordics. The migration of such groups to cities leads to increasing age and socio-economic disparities, as well as differences in value systems between rural and urban areas. Cities tend to host younger, more highly educated populations that often also hold more liberal values. Additionally, cities usually have higher shares of international migrants, contributing to more diverse value systems in those areas. Demographic processes may therefore deepen economic, social and cultural divides between areas (Kenny and Luca 2021, Larsson et al. 2021).

• Decline in public services: Rural-urban migration trends make it more challenging to uphold healthcare, education, public transport and other public services in rural and remote areas, which may fuel discontent. Service provision in the Nordic Region is partly reliant on local tax revenue. If local populations decline, public actors may struggle to find the funds to cover service needs. That financial struggle is made worse by challenging geographical circumstances such as long distances to services and older age structures than in urban areas. Lower wages mean that rural areas have difficulties attracting skilled workers for the public service sector. Many rural areas therefore have higher than average income tax rates to cover the costs, while the availability of services often remains lower than in urban areas. Trends to digitalize, privatize or centralize public services in larger towns or cities in order to cut costs have further contributed to a thinning out of services in rural areas, and contributed to discontent (Eriksson and Tollefsen 2022, Björling and Rönnblom 2023, Slätmo et al. 2023, Lundåsen 2024).

• The role of immigration: During the last decade, European countries (including the Nordics) have received large numbers of refugees and migrants from other parts of the world. Recent literature has found evidence that migrants, especially when they arrive in large numbers, can serve as a catalyst to channel disappointment and fears of economic insecurity (Dijkstra et al. 2020 and references therein). The timing of immigration and the origin, skill level and number of migrants appear to be critical in fuelling concerns that newcomers might take away jobs, diminish wages and/or put pressure on welfare systems (Larsson et al. 2021, Edo et al. 2019, Dehdari 2022). High levels of sudden immigration have also been shown to trigger a fear among groups of native-born citizens that their culture and community are under threat and that newcomers will dilute national or regional identity and traditional values (Alesina and Tabellini 2020).

• Green investments: Finally, in the interviews conducted with local civil servants for this project, the green transition was mentioned as a potential source of discontent. Interviewees stressed that the green transition can create many new opportunities and benefits for Nordic municipalities. Nonetheless, several also mentioned that discontent has arisen in areas where, for example, wind energy farms, biogas plants or solar panels are constructed. Discontent can arise if local residents feel that that they have not been sufficiently involved in the planning of such projects or do not fully understand the process. According to the interviewees, people living in the direct proximity of wind parks also become dissatisfied with changes in the landscape or if they see the value of their property decline due to the installations. In more remote and island communities, concern has been expressed that the electrification of public transport can lead to higher prices, slower traveling speed and fewer connections.